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Abstract 
 
As far as we know there has been no, or very little, empirical examination of 
search models and unemployment – vacancy relationship in New Zealand.  
We empirically examine dynamic matching functions in the New Zealand labor 
market over the period 1986-2006.   Further, it is well documented that 
although New Zealand and Australia embarked on similar wide economic 
reforms almost 25 years ago, the level of New Zealand’s labor productivity is 
still lower than that of Australia (Razzak, 2007) and lower than the US 
productivity level (Prescott, 2002).  It is has been argued that among the main 
explanatory variable is the low level of capital intensity – capital per hour 
worked - Razzak (2007) and Hall and Scobie (2005).  However, there has 
been no formal explanation for the low level of capital intensity.  This paper 
explains why capital investments are relatively lower in New Zealand.  We do 
this by examining the dynamics of the labor markets in New Zealand and 
Australia. 
 
JEL Classification numbers C13, C22, J64 
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1. Introduction 
 
Australia and New Zealand are interesting small and open economies the 
economic performances of which have been exceptional during the past 15 
years.  While the two countries embarked on similar wide reforms in the mid 
1980s and share common features, their labor markets seem different.   Table 
1 decomposes GDP per person ( ), which is a common measure of 
income, into GDP per hour (labor productivity) and hours worked per 
person (labor utilization). 
PY /
HY /
PH /
 
The main point of table 1 is that despite the fact that New Zealanders work 
longer hours than the Australians, Australia is richer and more productive.  
Further, labor utilization  can be decomposed into PH /
E
H
LF
E
W
LF
P
W ... , 
whereW is working age population 15 and over; is population;  is the 
labor force participation rate;
P WLF /
LF is the labor force;E is employment; andH is 
hours worked.  Table 2 reports some figures. 
 
There are two samples in table 2, 1986-1992 and 1993-2006.  We report the 
observations for the March quarter 1986 and December 1992 and the March 
quarter 1993 and December quarter 2006, for both New Zealand and 
Australia.  We report the growth rates over each sample.i  The table gives an 
idea about the trend in the components of labor utilization in both countries. 
 
The labor force participation rate grew much faster in New Zealand – twice as 
fast – than Australia in the second half of the sample; employment / labor ratio 
grew at a similar rate in both countries in the second half of the sample.  
Hours worked grew at a higher rate in New Zealand, but because employment 
in both countries increased significantly, hours / employment ratio grew at 
negative rates.  
 
Razzak (2007) demonstrates that the gap in labor productivity between New 
Zealand and Australia is a function of the gap in capital per hour worked 
between the two countries and other TFP shocks.  Hall and Scobie (2005) 
also note the capital shallowness of New Zealand as a reason for lower 
relative productivity.   
 
We calculate the ratio of capital investments to hours worked as a proxy for 
the rate of capital intensity.  Table 3 reports averages covering different 
samples over the period 1987 – 2007.  New Zealand’s capital investments per 
hour worked is 2/3 that of Australia, and the gap gets wider over time.  This 
paper will give an explanation for lack of relative capital investments in New 
Zealand.  
We will argue that one plausible reason for the relative shallowness of capital 
investments in New Zealand is that labor is relatively cheaper.  We use the 
Phillips –Loretan (1991) non-linear two-sided (dynamic) least squares 
estimator to estimate the slop of the Merz and Yashiv’s (2005) Beveridge 
curve  recursively.  This coefficients is a measure of the average quality of
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matching (or friction).  We estimate this parameter for New Zealand and 
Australia.   
We found that the average match quality increased in New Zealand (friction 
decreased) and decreased in Australia (friction increased) over the period 
2000 to 2006, particularly from 2004 to 2006.  Friction increases the price of 
labor relative to capital, hence labor is relatively cheaper in New Zealand than 
Australia.   
De Francisco (1999) studied the unemployment-vacancy dynamic in Australia 
so we will not redo that.  We begin with the examination of the dynamics of 
gross flows in the New Zealand labor market.  We estimate different 
specifications of matching functions a la Diamond (1982 a, b), Mortensen 
(1982), Pissarides (1984, 1985) and Petrongolo, and Pissarides (2001), 
Mortenson and Nagypal (2007), and Stevens (2007).ii   We find that the 
matching process of vacancies and workers has been costly in New Zealand, 
i.e., New Zealand’s labor market needs to be more than twice in size in order 
to double hiring or matching. The parameter estimates of the matching 
function vary considerably over time and with the measurement of matching.  
There is evidence of a decline in the positive externality from workers to firms; 
an increase in congestion (negative externality from unemployed worker to 
another); an increase in thick market effect (positive externality from firms 
searching for workers); and although the negative externality caused by firms 
on each other declined over time the size is still large. 
 
Factors that affect search intensity and the cost of searching are found to 
have significant explanatory power in the matching function.  We tested the 
effect of the replacement ratio (the ratio of unemployment benefits to wages), 
the shares of skilled labor, females, and young workers, on the outflow from 
unemployment to employment.     
 
The paper is organized in five sections.  Next, a theory is presented.  In 
sections 3 and 4 empirical results of estimating matching functions and the 
dynamic average quality of matching are discussed.   Conclusions are in 
section 5.  The data are described in an appendix. 
 
2. Theory 
 
The matching function approach is one particular tool to analyze friction and 
its effect on some labor market outcomes.  Friction in the labor market stems 
from imperfect information and heterogeneity among other things, (1932), 
Diamond (1982 a, b), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1984, 1985). 
 
In a simple model of the labor market, there are two main types of players: 
workers searching for employment and firms posting job advertisements.  
Searching for, and creating jobs are costly processes.  Generally, the search 
equilibrium is inefficient because these costs are sunk.  In this model, workers 
and vacant jobs are considered inputs to a production technology that 
generates matches as output.  A matching process along with an exogenous 
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job destruction rate induce steady-state unemployment and unfilled vacancy 
rates.  Thus, the model consists of a fixed number of unemployed workers, 
vacancies determined by free entry and the wages are determined by a 
bargaining mechanism.  Matches arrive at random. 
 
Consider a number of risk-neutral workers have the objective of maximizing 
the expected value of their income stream: 
 
∑∞
=0
1
t
t
tYE β  
 
Where ( ) is income, (tY β ) is a discount factor, and (E ) is the expectations 
operator. Workers earn wages when they are employed and nothing when 
they are unemployed (in a more complex model unemployed workers could 
earn unemployment benefits).  When they are employed, workers face a 
probability of being separated from their jobs, ( ).  When they are 
unemployed workers find jobs through a matching technology: 
s
 
),(2 VUmM = , 
 
where (M ) is the number of matches, (U ) is the number of aggregate 
unemployed workers and (V ) is the number of vacant jobs in the economy. 
The product of unemployment and vacancies determines the number of 
matches.  This function is increasing in both unemployment and vacancies; it 
exhibits a diminishing marginal productivity in each of the arguments; and 
possibly constant returns to scale (a testable hypothesis that will be tested in 
this paper).iii The probability that a vacancy will be matched during any period 
is: 
VVUmPv /),(3 = , 
 
And, constant returns to scale imply: 
 
)1),/((/),(4 VUmVVUmM ==  
 
Let UV /≡φ be labor market tightness (figure 1). 
 
The probability of a vacancy being matched is: 
 
)1,/()(5 VUmp ≡φ  
 
Similarly, the probability of an unemployed worker being matched – leaving 
unemployment – is: 
 
)(6 φφ p  
 
In the steady-state the number of workers separated from their jobs 
(unemployed) is , and equal to the number of workers finding jobs is )1( Us −
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Up )(φφ . In a stationary economy, the inverse of the probabilities is the mean 
duration of vacancies and unemployment respectively.  Figure 2 plots the 
vacancy rates in New Zealand and Australia.  Figure 3 plots the 
unemployment durations for New Zealand and Australia.  If jobs and workers 
are heterogeneous then these probabilities and durations differ across the 
labor market.  To deal with heterogeneity, the aggregate matching function 
should include individual characteristics when data are available. 
 
Solving for the labor market tightness gives: 
 
)1,/()(
7
VUms
s
ps
sU φφφ +=+=  
 
This equation implies a downward slopping curve in the two unknowns (U ) 
and (V ). The curve shifts outward to the right as separation rate ( ) 
increases, and towards the origin as matching improves. The relationship 
between the unemployment rate and the vacancy rate is knows as the 
Beveridge curve.
s
iv  King (2003) is a longer and very nice description of this 
literature. 
 
Sketch (1) illustrates. During cyclical upturns, the labor market will be strong, 
with low unemployment and many vacancies (such as point a); but during a 
downturn, high unemployment will be matched by fewer vacancies (point b).  
In the short-term the labor market moves along the curve as described in the 
left sketch.  However, over time, the slope and position of the curve can 
change (right sketch).  There are factors that shift the curve include such as 
efficient job-matching; movement from outside the labor force to 
unemployment (assuming the same job matching); an increase (or decrease) 
in job churning and factors that affecting the intensity and the cost of search.  
For example, increased job-matching shifts the curve towards the origin 
(inwards).  Figure 4 plots actual data of the vacancy and the unemployment 
rates from 1990 to 2006.  The plot unambiguously shows that the curve has 
shifted towards the origin over time and the slope has changed.  Figure 5 
plots the Australian Beveridge curve, where shifts toward the origin are less 
obvious. 
 
In this model, the number of workers is fixed.  Thus, the value of (φ ) is 
determined by the vacancy. Each period, a vacancy incurs a cost if it is 
unfilled.  The cost is given by a constant (C ).  The vacancy also produces 
output when it is filled, (Y ).  Firms keep posting vacancies until the marginal 
cost is equal to the marginal benefits.  Wages are determined by the Nash 
bargaining, where the parameter (γ ) is the workers’ bargaining power.  Thus: 
 
C
p
psY
)()1(
))((18 φγβ
φφγββ
−
++−=  
Solving equations (7) and (8) yields the steady state values of both 
unemployment and vacancies. In equilibrium, unemployment is decreasing in 
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output; increasing in the cost of vacancy, the separation, and the workers’ 
bargaining power. 
 
In New Zealand, output has been growing (the average annual GDP growth 
rate is 2.4 percent over the period 1992 – 2006); the bargaining power of 
workers has declined with the declining power of the unions, figure 6.  Note 
that the level of unionization is much higher in Australia, which might have 
some implications for the cross-Tasman movement of trade workers. The job 
separation figures have been falling for males and constant for females, figure 
7. Short-term duration of unemployment (less than 4 weeks) has been volatile 
and trending upward, figure 8, but long-term duration of unemployment (over 
52 weeks) has been falling, figure 9.  Workers stay unemployed for longer 
time in Australia. Both short and long term unemployment durations are larger 
than those of New Zealand’s. 
 
3. Matching process 
 
This section documents estimates of the matching functions for New Zealand.  
Matching functions summarize trading technologies between firms that post 
job vacancies (in newspapers, magazines, on the net, employment agencies, 
etc) and workers who look for jobs (the unemployed).  Matching is a complex 
process.  The matching function, however, is a simple representation of this 
process, which gives the number of jobs formed at any moment in time in 
terms of the number of workers looking for jobs and the number of firms 
looking for workers. A typical matching function is given by the Cobb-Douglas 
function: 
 
εαα eVUM ttt 219 =  
 
The parameter 1α measures the positive externality from workers to firms 
and 2α  measures the positive externality caused by firms on searching 
workers (thick-market effect); thus 11 −α is a measure of the negative 
externality or congestion caused by one unemployed worker on others; 
similarly 12 −α measures the negative externality from one firm to another. The 
magnitudes of 1α and 2α are sensitive to the measurement of the dependent 
variable , the sample size among other things.tM
v
 
We will estimate the matching function for New Zealand only because the 
Australian gross flows data are only available from 1997.  We use two 
common measures for the dependent variable : (1) total outflows from 
unemployment, which includes outflows from unemployment to unemployment 
and from unemployment to ‘not’ in the labor force; (2) outflows from 
unemployment to employment only.  New Zealand has no vacancy data.  
However, we have a reasonably consistent and long time series of job ads.  
The data have been produced by the ANZ bank (a commercial bank) since 
the 1990s.  The data include job ads in newspapers in the three big cities, 
Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch, which they cover most of the labor 
tM
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market in New Zealand.  Recently, they added job ads from other smaller 
cities and also ads posted on Net.  For consistency, we will use the big three 
cities as a proxy for the New Zealand labor market and will ignore ads posted 
on the Net to avoid potential double counting.   
 
We seasonally adjusted the data using a variety of models and picked the 
models that best fit using a variety of commonly used information criteria. 
Figures 10 to 13 Plot the data used in estimating the matching functions. The 
outflows data have a hump in the early 1990s.  For years following the reform 
in 1984, unemployment continued to rise sharply, possibly, for two reasons.  
First, it increased because of the disinflation process and the change in 
expectations about prices and consequently real wages.  Second, 
unemployment increased because of the privatizations of state-owned 
enterprises, where more workers were laid off.  Once the effects of the reform 
were understood and inflation expectations were brought down, 
unemployment continued to fall with the exception of the Asian crises period 
in 1997-1998, which caused a small recession in New Zealand.  Employment 
growth kept increasing since the 1990s. 
 
Job ads experienced a couple of dips one is large in the early 1990s at the 
same time of the increase in unemployment then another smaller one during 
the Asian crises.  The Australian vacancy data look almost the same as New 
Zealand’s up to 1998 then there is a huge increase in vacancies. 
 
The trend is examined by testing for unit root. A variety of commonly used unit 
root tests do not reject the hypothesis of unit root, which might be a sign of 
low power of the tests.  We are cautious that the tests are picking up the effect 
of changes in policy from the mid 1980s up to1992.   New Zealand’s reform 
process started in 1984 and continued until 1992.  Whether the data have unit 
roots (and cointegrtaed) or do not have unit roots (stationary), OLS estimates 
for regressions in levels will be super-consistent.  However, the sharp 
increase (the hump) in outflows and the dip in job-ads in the early 1990s 
hampers the estimation considerably.  A more appropriate sample would be 
from 1994Q1 to 2006Q2 instead.  There is another problem, the 
unemployment and job ads might not be strictly exogenous.  If they are not 
then OLS estimates will be biased and inconsistent.vi
 
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) report about 20 to 22 international 
estimates of 1α and 2α using an equation like (9) with different methods, 
different dependent variables etc.  The average of these international 
estimates for 1α is 0.49 and 0.50 for 2α .  They sum to one, hence most of the 
international matching functions exhibit constant returns to scale.  These 
estimates are different in the case of New Zealand.  We estimate the 
coefficients using both non-linear least squares and linear least squares 
methods.  Table 4 reports the results of the estimates of the nonlinear function 
and table 5 reports those of the linear model. 
 
The first column in table 4 reports the coefficients and some statistics. The 
table reports two sets of results. The first is when matching is measured by tM
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total outflows, where four sets of results are reported.  There are two samples: 
a sample from 1990Q1 to 2006Q2 and another from 1994Q1 to 2006Q2, 
which covers the period following the hump shown in figure 10.  The other set 
of results corresponds to the case where is proxied by outflows from 
unemployment to employment only.  This is also estimated for two different 
samples. 
tM
 
The coefficients 1α and 2α vary in magnitudes.  The coefficient 1α , which 
corresponds to unemployment, measures the positive externality from workers 
to firms.  The coefficient 2α  measures the positive externality caused by firms 
on the searching workers (i.e., thick market effect).  So 11 −α is a small 
negative externality (congestion) inflicted by an unemployed worker on 
another.  Similarly, 12 −α measures the negative externality by firms on each 
other. 
 
Over the period 1990 to 2006, 1α is large, near unity when the dependent 
variable is total outflows.  The coefficient estimate becomes smaller (0.8) over 
the sample 1994-2006.  This suggests that positive externality from workers to 
firms seems to have declined over time.  The magnitudes of the coefficient 
estimates change significantly when we use the outflows from unemployment 
to employment as a dependent variable.  In the sample from 1990 to 2006, 
the coefficient estimate 1α is 0.6, much smaller that the earlier estimates.  It 
becomes 0.3 in the sample from 1994 to 2006.  These estimates also suggest 
a decrease in positive externality from workers to firms.  The results suggest 
that 11 −α increases over time indicating an increase in the congestion effect 
caused by the unemployed on other unemployed workers. 
 
However, 2α is small and negative in the first two regressions and positive but 
small after 1994.  Negative values probably imply a misspecification.  In the 
regressions where the dependent variable is the outflows from unemployment 
to employment the estimated coefficient 2α becomes positive and much larger 
over the period from 1994-2006, which suggests an increase in the positive 
externality caused by firms on searching workers (thick market effect). 
However, there is still a significant negative externality from one firm to 
another. These results are consistent with the increase in skill shortages with 
unemployed workers of very different skills. 
 
Although the coefficient of unemployment 1α is closer to 0.50 than that of job-
ads in some of the regressions, the hypothesis that the coefficients 1α + 2α =1 
is rejected.  The matching function in New Zealand does not exhibit constant 
returns to scale but rather decreasing returns to scale.   Decreasing returns to 
scale mean that the New Zealand labor market needs to be more than double 
in size in order to double matching. The matching process in New Zealand 
has been costly.  Imposing a constant return to scale on the matching function 
and testing it indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from unity, 
i.e., it does not hold. 
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We also estimate the coefficients 1α and 2α recursively over the sample Dec 
2000 to June 2006 (the model includes time trend).  We estimate the model 
up to September 2000 then we add one observation and re-estimate and so 
on so forth.  In figure 14 we plot the recursive coefficient estimates from model 
(1) in table 4, where the dependent variable is total outflows and from model 
(2), where the dependent variable is outflows from unemployment to 
employment.  Both estimates declined over time, which confirms our earlier 
interpretation that positive externality from workers to firms has been declining 
(downward drift) and that the function has shifted over time.   Conversely and 
without plotting, 11 −α and 12 −α  must have increased over time, which 
indicate an increase in the positive externality caused by firms on searching 
workers. 
 
The term trend squared has a negative and a significant coefficient, which 
also suggests that the matching function shifted downwards. The regression’s 
residuals are not white noise, which means there are some dynamic that need 
to be explained. 
 
The fit of the model deteriorates as the sample gets shorter, i.e., the value of 
adjusted 2R declines with the sample size. The statistics become very 
small when the dependent is the outflows from unemployment to 
employment.
DW
vii We tested the residuals for Whiteness using the cumulated 
periodogram test Maximum gap.  It has a value > than the critical values at 
the 1, 5 and 0 percent levels. The residuals are, therefore, not white noise, 
which means that there is some unexplained dynamic that we have to explain. 
 
3.1 More on estimation 
 
To deal with unexplained dynamics in the outflows from unemployment to 
employment and possible misspecification, we estimate a linear function (not 
in log), Pissarides (1986). 
 
tttttttt
i
itt McIcucvcucvcYVLbLbLbyaLy ψ+++Δ+Δ++++++= ~)/)(1()(10 754321221 L
 
The idea behind equation (10) is that in the steady-state, the rate of outflows 
from unemployment to employment (the outflow from unemployment to 
employment / the number of unemployed workers) depend on the vacancy 
rate , the unemployment rate , variables that affect search intensity , 
and variables that proxy structural mismatches in the economy
ty
tv tu tI
tM
~ . 
 
There are many variables that could be used to measure search intensity, but 
data are readily available for three.  These three variables are (1) the share of 
young workers age 15-19 in working age population.  Younger workers might 
have lower search intensity; (2) the share of females in working age 
population, where more female involved in search the higher the flow from 
unemployment to employment; and (3) the replacement ratio, which is the 
ratio of total unemployment benefits to wages, which increases the cost of 
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search.  For mismatch ( tM
~ ), the share of workers with university and post 
university qualifications (skilled labor) to total employed workers is used.  
Results are reported in table 5.viii There are three sets of results.  The first two 
are in columns 2-5 and the third is in columns 6 and 7. 
 
The first set of results: There is a statistically significant lagged dependent 
variable, thus outflows are persistent.  The contemporaneous ratio of vacancy 
to unemployment is statistically significant and has a positive sign.  The sum 
of the four lagged values is small and negative. The vacancy rate is negative 
and significant while the unemployment rate has no effect on the outflows.  
The latter result is quite the opposite of what we had in the non-linear 
matching function that we estimated earlier.  These results are not unique to 
New Zealand.  Pissarides (1986) found similar results for Britain.  The 
changes in vacancy and in unemployment rates are negative and significant, 
same as in Pissarides (1986).  These results indicate decreasing returns to 
scale.  The trend and squared trend are insignificant. 
 
The second set of results: we replaced the trend in equation (10) with three 
shift variables: for mismatching we added the share of university and post- 
university qualified workers in total employment; and for search intensity we 
added the share of female workers in working age population and the share of 
workers aged 15 to 19 in working age population.  Most of the previous results 
still hold.  The share of skilled workers seems significant and negative. It 
indicates that the level of skills has been reducing the matching.  This might 
mean that the vacancies created in the economy are mostly for unskilled 
labor.  Neither female nor the young workers share in working age population 
is significant. 
 
The third set of results: We change the sample to March 1994 – June 2006 
because the replacement ratio (the ratio of total unemployment benefits to 
wages) is only available from 1994.  Most of the previous results still hold.  
The replacement ratio is insignificant. 
 
Figure 15 plots the actual and fitted values of these three regressions.  The 
Cumulated Periodogram test indicates that the residuals are serially 
uncorrelated.  However, if these variables are cointegrated we have to use a 
more suitable estimator than OLS.  A proper estimation method is the Phillips-
Loretan (1991) non-linear two-sided dynamic least squares.ix
 
ttt
k
ki
ititt xyxxy εαργα +−+Δ+= −−
−=
−∑ )(11 11  
where is a vector that includes the vacancy rate, the unemployment rate, the 
ratio of vacancy to unemployment, variables that proxy and
tx
tI tM
~ .  Equation 
(11) is estimated over the period 1995Q1-2004Q2 because some data are not 
available for earlier and latter periods and because of the lag and lead 
differences.  The results are reported in table 6.  The long-run function α1−′tx  
represents the long-run.  We plot it against the actual value of outflows from 
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unemployment to employment in figure 16.  Clearly, there is a good 
correlation between matching and the levels of the explanatory variables in 
the long run. 
 
These results are different from those reported earlier.  All the level variables 
are significant.  The signs remained unchanged. The dynamic effects are 
more interesting.  All the contemporaneous changes are significant, except 
the share of young workers, which is insignificant and the replacement ratio, 
which is only borderline significant. 
 
The positive signs in the contemporaneous, lag and lead changes of the 
share of skilled workers are most interesting.  Remember that the level has a 
negative sign.  The interpretation of the positive signs of the differenced 
variables is that the firm’s expectation of an increase in the level of skills next 
period induces more investments in skill-complementary technology.  The 
firms posts vacancies for skilled labor, hence the increase in matching. 
 
For the share of females, all the changes – contemporaneous, lag and lead – 
are positive and significant.  The increase in female participations clearly 
improved the matching.  A one percent increase in female participation leads 
to 0.30 percent increase in matching; a one percent increase in last period 
change in female participation increases matching by 0.35 percent; and a one 
percent increase in expected next period change in female participation 
increases matching by 0.32 percent.    
 
The contemporaneous and lagged values the share of young workers and the 
replacement ratio seem to have insignificant impact on matching.  However, a 
one percent increase in the expected share of young workers in working age 
population increases matching by 0.15 percent.  And, a one percent increase 
in the expected replacement ratio ( 1+Δ t ) leads to a ½ percent decrease in 
matching. 
 
 
4. Friction and the quality of matching  
 
Razzak (2007) explains the gap in labor productivity between New Zealand 
and Australia by capital intensity and a few TFP shocks.  Capital intensity, 
however, is a major culprit.  If New Zealand’s annual capital intensity growth 
increase by 1 percent relative to Australia, labor productivity growth can 
increase by as much as a ¼ percent.  Hall and Scobie (2005) also noticed the 
same problem of ‘shallow capital’ in New Zealand.  The question is why New 
Zealand has a lower capital intensity level than Australia?  The answer might 
be found in the labor market because the dynamic (and policies) of the labor 
market affects the relative price of labor to capital. 
 
We use the Phillips – Loretan (1991) two-sided dynamic least squares 
estimator below to estimate the job destruction rate and the average match 
quality (friction) from December 1990 to December 2000 for both New 
Zealand and Australia.  We then recursively estimate the function, observation 
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by observation from March 2001 to March 2006. This gives us 22 estimates of 
ψ  and  over time. q
ttt
k
ki
ititt qvnvqvn υργ +−+Δ+= −−
−=
−∑ )(12 11  
Where is the log of the employment rate, is the log vacancy rate andtn tv ρ is 
ψ−1 .  The regression includes a constant term, trend and trend squared 
terms. 
 
We only plot the estimated for the period March 2004 to March 2006 in 
figure 17.  This covers the period when the labor market tightness in Australia 
relative to that in New Zealand, increased significantly.  In figure 17, Visually, 
there is a positive drift in the estimates for New Zealand.  The higher the value 
of the higher the matching quality and the lesser is the friction in the labor 
market, which implies that the increase in employment is higher for a given 
number of vacancies making investments in labor relatively cheaper than 
capital.  Less friction implies lower relative price of labor. 
tq
tq
 
The average estimated value ofψ  over the period March 2001 to Mar 2006 
(the average rate of job destruction) is about 20 percent.  The rate of job 
destruction is almost constant over time, but seems to vary with the business 
cycle.  It increases to 22 percent in 1997-1998 Asian crises.  This estimate is 
slightly larger than the estimates reported in Carrol et al. (2002) who used 
micro data, different samples, and different methodology.x
 
For Australia, using data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics and the 
same method of estimation, average declines over time, i.e., increase in 
labor market frictions.  This seems more consistent with tight labor markets 
with low unemployment rates. 
q
 
Comparing New Zealand and Australia’s results suggest that the Australian 
firms seem to face stronger friction in the labor market, which makes investing 
in capital rather a cheaper option for them.  Also, the average rate of job 
destruction is 8 percent, which is several times lower then that of New 
Zealand.  The results for Australia seem consistent with some theoretical 
models, Basu (2006). 
 
These estimates, for New Zealand and Australia seem consistent with the 
stylized facts that Australia’s labor productivity is relatively higher than New 
Zealand’s.  For New Zealand, the higher value of the estimate of the average 
quality of matching (lesser is the friction in the labor market) implies that the 
increase in employment is higher for a given number of vacancies making 
investments in labor relatively cheaper than capital. 
 
For Australia, the lower value of the estimate of the average quality of 
matching (higher is the friction in the labor market) implies that the increase in 
employment is lower for a given number of vacancies making investments in 
labor relatively more expensive than capital. 
W. A. Razzak, New Zealand Department of Labor, 15/04/2008 11 
12 
 
Contrary to New Zealand, Australia’s labor has more capital to work with, thus 
higher labor productivity.  And, New Zealand firms post more low-skill 
vacancies and match them with relatively low-skill workers than Australia 
because New Zealand firms have low capital intensity, thus do not have the 
incentive to create high-skilled jobs. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The dynamics of the gross outflows have been examined via matching 
functions, and some interesting and meaningful description of the labor 
market has been drawn. However, the focal point of this paper was to explore 
whether there is a meaning explanation of the relatively low labor productivity 
in New Zealand in the process of search and matching (friction).  The main 
conclusion is that New Zealand labor market arrangements seem to have 
lowered the price of labor relative to capital, which induced firms to invest 
more in labor than capital.  The opposite is true in Australia.  More capital 
makes existing labor more productive. 
 
To summarize, we estimates a Cobb-Douglas matching function in different 
specifications.  We found decreasing returns to scale, which means that to 
double the matching of vacancies and unemployed workers the New Zealand 
labor market must be more than twice as big.  The matching function seems 
to have shifted overtime.  The estimation also reveals some unexplained 
dynamics most likely resulting from misspecification.  We found that positive 
externality from unemployed workers to firms declined over time; congestion – 
the negative externality from unemployed worker to another – has increased 
over time; positive externality from firms to workers – thick worker effect – 
increased over time; and negative externality from one to another has 
declined. 
 
To remedy the unexplained dynamic problem, we estimated a linear matching 
function using an appropriate dynamic estimation method and augmented it 
with variables to measure the search intensity and the cost of search, such as 
the share of females in working age population, the share of young workers in 
working age population, the share of skilled labor in total employment, and the 
replacement ratio. We found evidence of their significance in affecting 
matching.   
 
New Zealand’s productivity is low relative to Australia.  It is well documented 
that New Zealand has a low capital intensity relative to Australia and that this 
‘capital shallowness’ explain lots of the labor productivity gap between the two 
countries.  The question this paper asks is why New Zealand has relatively 
low capital intensity and whether the answer lies in the labor market? 
 
Our recursive estimates of the average quality of matching (friction) increased 
(declined) more in New Zealand than Australia over the past 6 years.  For 
New Zealand, the higher value of the estimate of the average quality of 
matching (lesser is the friction in the labor market) implies that the increase in 
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employment is higher for a given number of vacancies making investments in 
labor relatively cheaper than capital. 
 
For Australia, the lower value of the estimate of the average quality of 
matching (higher is the friction in the labor market) implies that the increase in 
employment is lower for a given number of vacancies making investments in 
labor relatively more expensive than capital. 
 
Contrary to New Zealand, Australia’s labor has more capital to work with, thus 
higher labor productivity.  And, New Zealand firms post more low-skill 
vacancies and match them with relatively low-skill workers than Australia 
because New Zealand firms have low capital intensity, thus do not have the 
incentive to create high-skilled jobs. 
 
The micro level evidence seems also somewhat consistent with the results 
above.  Hyslop and Mare (2006) study the compositional changes of workers 
and firms in New Zealand.  They found that the average worker unobserved 
fixed effect on earnings has declined by 5 percent over the period 1999-2005.   
Their interpretation was that during upward phase of the business cycle 
(expansionary employment) more low-productivity workers get drawn into the 
labor market. 
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Table 1: GDP per Working Age Population (Australia=100) 
 GDP per Person GDP per Hour Hour per Person 
1987Q2-1992Q4 74.1 72 103 
1993Q1-2006Q4 71.5 66 108.4 
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Table 2: Decomposition of Labor Utilization 
New Zealand PW /  LF Participation Rate LFE /  EH /  
March 1986 0.77  67.1  0.96  34.9 
December 1992 0.81  63.5  0.90  34.2 
Growth Rate 5.0% -5.51% -6.4% -2.0% 
March 1993 0.82  63.3  0.90  35.7 
December 2006 0.83   68.0  0.96  34.4 
Growth Rate 1.2%  7.16%  6.4% -3.70 
     
Australia     
March 1986 0.76  61.57  0.92  29.78 
December 1992 0.77  62.61  0.89  28.15 
Growth Rate 1.3%  1.67% -3.15% -5.6% 
March 1993 0.77  62.47  0.89  30.41 
December 2006 0.79  64.72  0.95  29.32 
Growth Rate 2.5%  3.5%  6.5% -3.6% 
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Table 3: Capital investments per hour-worked (Australia = 100) 
 Average  
1987Q-1992Q4 66.53 
1993Q1-2007Q1 66.91 
2003Q1-2007Q1 64.10  
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Table 4: Estimates of the Matching Function 1990Q1 – 2006Q2 
εαα eVUM ttt 21= ; U in the number of unemployed. V is job ads. 
 tM : total outflows 
i
tM : outflows from unemployment to employment 
ii
Sample 90q1-06q2 90q1-06q2 94q1-06q2 94q1-06q2 90q1-06q2 90q1-06q2 94q1-06q2 94q1-06q2 
1α  0.96 
(0.0000) 
0.95 
(0.0000) 
0.81 
(0.0000) 
0.80 
(0.0000) 
0.60 
(0.0000) 
0.60 
(0.0000) 
0.30 
(0.0000) 
0.37 
(0.0000) 
2α  -0.06 
(0.0251) 
-0.06 
(0.0194) 
0.12 
(0.0760) 
0.12 
(0.0693) 
0.06 
(0.0257) 
0.07 
(0.0363) 
0.32 
(0.0000) 
0.32 
(0.0000) 
Trend*1000 -0.085 
(0.9079) 
- -1.85 
(0.0636) 
- 1.57 
(0.0109) 
- -0.35 
(0.6628) 
- 
Trend 
Sq.*1000 
- -0.0015 
(0.8407) 
- -0.016 
(0.0682) 
- 0.016 
(0.0264) 
- -0.0024 
(0.7403) 
2R  0.90 0.90 0.83 0.83 0.59 0.59 0.45 0.45 
DW iii 1.64 1.64 1.66 1.65 0.70 0.71 0.85 0.85 
SE iv 6.34 6.34 5.34 5.35 1.87 1.86 1.56 1.56 
Max. gap 
2
0.1397 v 0.1397 v 0.1498 vi 0.1517 vi 0.4960 0.4957 0.4151 0.4151 
1χ vii 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
-i  These are total outflows from unemployment to unemployment, not in labor force, and to employment. 
-ii These are outflows from unemployment to employment only. 
-iii The DW statistic requires a constant term in the regression, nevertheless, it is a useful statistic. 
-iv The Newey-West procedure is used to compute the variance-covariance matrix. 
-v This is the Cumulated Periodogram test, which tests the gap from the density function of a white noise process. 
The Approximate rejection limits are 1%=0.2037, 5%= 0.1700 and 10%= 0.1525.  The null hypothesis is white nose. 
-vi The Approximate rejection limits are 1%=0.2881, 5%= 0.2404 and 10%= 0.2157. 
2-vii this is the P value of the test for the restriction1χ 1α + 2α =1. 
P vales are in parentheses. 
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Table 5: The Linear Matching Functions OLS Estimates 
tttttttt
i
itt McIcucvcucvcYVLbLbLbyaLy ψ+++Δ+Δ++++++= ~)/)(1()(10 754321221 L  
 March 1990- June 2006 March 1994-December 2004 
Variable Coefficient P value Coefficient P value Coefficient P value 
Constant 0.15 0.1699 0.88 0.5427 -3.16 0.1203 
1−ty
i 0.59 0.0000 0.54 0.0000 0.41 0.0060 
tUV )/(
ii 0.0027 0.0000 0.002 0.0002 0.004 0.0000 
1)/( −tUV  -0.002 0.0038 -0.001 0.0236 -0.003 0.0037 
2)/( −tUV  0.0004 0.3510 0.0005 0.2730 0.000 0.9413 
3)/( −tUV  -0.0011 0.0129 -0.0011 0.0140 -0.001 0.0274 
4)/( −tUV  0.0007 0.0386 0.0007 0.0597 0.001 0.0076 
tv  -0.024 0.0504 -0.027 0.0449 -0.02 0.2635 
tu  0.007 0.3732 -0.01 0.3624 -0.008 0.3680 
tvΔ  -0.021 0.0898 -0.01 0.0296 -0.04 0.0439 
tuΔ  -0.017 0.0547 -0.018 0.0203 0.003 0.7616 
1000*Trend  0.0015 0.2358 - - -  
1000*2Trend  -0.00002 0.1537 - - -  
:~ tM        
Skills iii -  -0.007 0.0743 -0.005 0.3887 
:tI        
Female iv -  -0.009 0.7162 0.06 0.0839 
Young v -  -0.005 0.3087 0.009 0.3024 
Replacement 
Ratio vi
-  - - 0.05 0.7444 
2R  0.91  0.91  0.90  
GapMax  vii 0.0775  0.0915  0.1437  
 
i- The dependent variable is the rate of outflows from unemployment to employment. 
ii- V is the ANZ ads in the three big cities Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch and 
U is the HLFS number of unemployed workers. Small letters denote the rates. 
iii- Skills is the share of employed workers with university and post university 
qualifications in total employment. 
iv- Female is the share of female workers in working age population. 
v- Young is the share of workers age 15-19 & 20-24 in working age population. 
vi- Replacement ratio is total unemployment benefits to wage of all employed 
workers fulltime and part-time ratio. 
vii- Residuals were diagnosed using a number of tests for whiteness.  Among these 
tests is the Cumulated Periodogram test, which tests the gap from the density 
function of a white noise process.  The Approximate rejection limits are 1%=0.2881, 
5%= 0.2404 and 10%= 0.2157.  The null hypothesis is white nose. 
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Table 6: The Phillips – Loretan Dynamic two-sided least squared i
ttt
k
ki
ititt xyxxy εαργα +−+Δ+= −−
−=
−∑ )(11 11 , where includes: vacancy rate, 
unemployment rate, the ratio of vacancy to unemployment, the share of skilled 
labor in employment, the share of females in population, the share young 
workers in population and the replacement ratio. Sample 1995Q1 – 2004Q2. 
tx
Variable Coefficient t  statistic P value 
tv
ii -0.15 -2.35 0.0184 
tu  0.11 2.88 0.0038 
tUV )/(  0.01 2.71 0.0066 
tSkills
 iii -0.06 -4.97 0.0000 
tFemale  
iv 0.03 2.82 0.0047 
tYoung
v -0.04 -2.26 0.0235 
tplaceRe
vi -1.27 -2.20 0.0272 
tvΔ  0.13 2.75 0.0058 
1−Δ tv  -0.003 -0.10 0.9129 
1+Δ tv  0.03 1.35 0.1739 
tuΔ  -0.11 -3.70 0.0002 
1−Δ tu  0.02 1.51 0.1305 
1+Δ tu  -0.02 -1.23 0.2172 
tUV )/(Δ  -0.007 -2.95 0.0032 
1)/( −Δ tUV  0.000 0.42 0.6679 
1)/( +Δ tUV  -0.002 -1.39 0.1636 
tskillsΔ  0.07 5.91 0.0000 
1−Δ tSkills  0.04 7.44 0.0000 
1+Δ tSkills  0.01 3.16 0.0015 
tFemaleΔ  0.30 2.45 0.0143 
1−Δ tFemale  0.35 3.24 0.0011 
1+Δ tFemale  0.32 2.59 0.0095 
tYoungΔ  0.06 1.05 0.2905 
1−Δ tYoung  0.10 1.43 0.1519 
1+Δ tYoung  0.15 3.29 0.0009 
tplaceReΔ  0.78 1.63 0.1028 
1Re −Δ tplace  0.03 0.23 0.8136 
1Re +Δ tplace  -0.50 -4.13 0.0000 ρ  0.44 3.74 0.0001 
GapMax vii 0.1278   
i- The dependent variable is the outflows from unemployment to employment. 
ii- V  is the ANZ ads in the three big cities Auckland, Wellington and 
Christchurch and U is the HLFS number of unemployed workers. Lowercase 
denotes the rates of vacancy and unemployment (continue). 
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iii- Skills is the share of employed workers with university and post university 
qualifications in total employment. 
iv- Female is the share of female workers in working age population. 
v- Young is the share of workers age 15-19 in working age population. 
vi- Replacement ratio is total unemployment benefits to wage of all employed 
workers fulltime and part-time ratio. 
vii- : Residuals are white noise.  The approximate rejection limits are 
1%=0.2881;  
0H
5%=0.2404 and 10%=0.2157. 
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Figure 2 
 New Zealand Job Ads and Australia Vacancy
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Figure 3 
 
Gross Flows Unemployment Duration
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Figure 5 
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Figure 6 
 
 Union Membership (Percent of employment)
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Figure 7 
Laid off, Dismissed and made Redundant
as ratio of total unemployed 
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Figure 8 
Unemployment Duration: 1 Week as ratio to total unemployment
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Figure 9 
Duration Unemployed > 52 Weeks
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Figure 10 
 Outflows
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Figure 11 
 
 The Share of University and Post University Workers in Employment
in New Zealand
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Figure 12 
Shares of Females & Young Workers Age 15-19 and 20-24 in Working 
Age Population in New Zealand
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Figure 13 
 
The Replacement Ratio
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Figure 14 
 
Recursive Estimates of Alpha1 and Alpha2 
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Figure 15 
 
Linear Matching Function Actual and Fitted Values
0.13
0.15
0.17
0.19
0.21
0.23
0.25
0.27
0.29
0.31
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
Actual 
Fitted Values  1
Fitted Values 2
Fitted Values 3
 
 
Figure 16 
 
Actual Outflows and The Phillips - Loretan Long Run Equilibrium 
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Figure 17 
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Data Appendix 
 
tM Matching is defined as: 
 
(1) Total outflows which includes outflows from unemployment to 
unemployment, from unemployment to employment and from 
unemployment to not-in-labor force; 
(2) Outflows from unemployment to employment only. 
(3) The rate of outflows is outflows / number of unemployed. 
Source: Household Labor Force Survey (HLFS). 
 
tU  is the total number of unemployed workers. 
Source (HLFS). 
 
tV  is job ads.  We use job ads for Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch only. 
Source (ANZ Bank). 
 
tu  is the unemployment rate. 
tv  is the vacancy rate, where job ads for the big three cities deflated by HLFS 
number of employed workers for  whole economy.  We tried to deflate by 
employment in the three big cities, and also examined ANZ vacancy rate data, 
but found no significant differences. 
 
tE is total full time employment 
Source (HLFS) 
 
tSkill is defined as the share of workers who have university and post 
university qualifications in total employment. 
Source (HLFS) 
 
tFemale is the share of full time female workers in working age population. 
Source (HLFS) 
 
tYoung is the share of workers aged 15-19 and 20-24 in working age 
population. 
Source (HLFS) 
 
tplaceRe is the replacement ratio defined as total unemployment  benefits to 
wages.  The unemployment benefit data are from the Ministry of Social 
Development. Wages is hourly wages times the number of hours worked. 
 
The Australian data are from the Australian Bureau of Statistics website. 
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100).ln 19861992 xx −i The growth rate is, e.g., (ln .  New Zealand changed the Employment 
contract Act of 1991 to the Employment Relations Act in 2002. There are subtle 
differences to promote collective bargaining and good faith.  It has been argued that one 
should split the sample in 2002.  We do not do that because the sample would be small 
and because various evaluation studies showed that the new Act has not affected the 
performance of the labor market(Waldegrave, Anderson and Wong, 2003).       
 
ii  See also, Fontaine (2007) on the matching function and social networks, Kagasharju et 
al. (2005) on matching function and the use of disaggregated data, Kano amd Makoto 
(2005) for evidence on Japan. 
 
iii Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) provide a survey of the literature and argue that 
CRTS has wide empirical support. Increasing returns to scale gives rise to the possibility 
of multiple equilibrium.  It implies that hiring is twice as high in a labor market that is 
twice as big.      
  
iv For New Zealand see Silverston (2001) and (2006).  For Australia see De Francisco 
(1999).  
 
v  Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) provide a list of problems with matching functions. 
 
vi Before we estimate the matching unction we tested all variables for unit root using a 
variety of common unit root tests with different specifications and lag specifications.  We 
tested these lags thoroughly using a variety of common information criteria.  We could 
not reject the unit root hypothesis in job ads, unemployment and the outflows from 
unemployment to employment.  These results may reflect the weak powers of these 
tests.  We tested the data again for a shorter sample, 1994Q1 to 2006Q2 to avoid the 
break in the data.  We still could not reject the unit root hypothesis. 
 
vii Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) do not report tests of the residuals. 
 
viii Again, a variety of commonly used tests for unit roots, different model specifications, 
and different information criteria are used to test the variables.  There is a strong 
evidence of unit roots in the data.  Although the tests have low powers, the data exhibit 
visible trends. For this reason I will assume that the data have unit roots.  To test for no 
cointegration I regressed the dependent variable on a constant, trend, and the 
contemporaneous vacancy rate, the unemployment rate, the ratio of vacancy to 
unemployment, skills, female, young and the replacement ratio (as defined above), and 
tested the residuals for unit root.  Then I estimated an error correction regression and 
tested whether the error correction terms is equal to zero.  I found the error correction 
term to have a very high t statistics, -4.7, which implies that the variables might very 
well be cointegrtaed. The OLS estimated reported in table 4 are most probably super-
consistent. 
 
ix The estimator takes into account unit roots, cointegration, the serial correlation of the 
residuals and the endogeneity problems. 
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x Carrol et al. (2002) used disaggregated data from LEED (Linked employee-employers data) and 
reported an average estimate of 15.3 percent over the period 1994-2001. They measure the job 
destruction rate as the total decrease in employment across contracting and dying firms relative to 
average total employment. ∑ −>=Δ −i tititititdt EEEEEIe /)])(([ 1 , where I is an indicator function, 
which is equal to one if the expression in parentheses is true, and zero otherwise.  They also reported 
that the estimate varies across industries, 12.8 to 27.7, which averaged to be 18.98 percent.  The 
estimate also varies with the firm’s size, 22.3 percent for a firm with 1 to 5 workers and 10 percent for 
a firm with more than 100 workers, averaging 15.2.  The estimates reported in this paper, which uses 
a completely different data set, highly aggregated, and a different model, are almost the same as the 
estimates reported using the LEED (Linked Employer – Employee Data) disaggregated data. 
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